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Abstract 
Ireland, the UK and the USA are heterogeneous examples of liberal worlds of welfare 
capitalism yet all three countries were deeply implicated in the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Examining these three countries together provides the opportunity to further develop an 
international comparative political economy of instability in the context of the globalised and 
financialised dimensions of Anglo-liberal capitalism and disciplinary governance.  Our analysis 
is guided by the concept of disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill 1995) through which we explore: i) 
the dynamics that have shaped the impacts of and responses to the Great Recession; ii) the 
ways in which state market relations, shaped by differentiated accommodations to market 
imperative or market discipline, have been used as disciplinary tools and how these have 
interacted with existing social divisions and iii) the implications for shaping conditions for 
resistance. We suggest that the neoliberal pathways of each country, whilst not uniform, 
mark a `step-change’ and acceleration in the operation of disciplinary neoliberalism, and is 
particularly evident in what we identify as the coercive commodification of social policy.   
 
Key words: Disciplinary neoliberalism; coercive commodification; post-crisis; welfare state; 
Anglo-liberal capitalism  
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Ireland, the UK and the USA are heterogeneous examples of liberal (Esping-Andersen 1990) 
or Anglo-liberal (Hay 2013) welfare capitalism, yet all three countries were deeply implicated 
in the financial crisis. Examining the countries together provides the opportunity to contribute 
to and further develop an international comparative political economy of instability in the 
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context of the globalised and financialised dimensions of Anglo-liberal capitalism and 
disciplinary governance.  Our analysis, which is necessarily synoptic, is guided by the concept 
of disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill 1995; 2008; 2017) with a focus on conflict and resistance.  
We extend Gill’s (1995) original exposition of the term to explore the disciplinary relations 
between state, market and society in Ireland, UK and the USA, representing political 
economies characterised by liberal welfare states, integration into increasingly complex 
global financial markets, excessive leverage and the expansion of individual credit and debt, 
as well as poor risk management and property bubbles (Kennett et al., 2013). These cases 
provide the opportunity to consider their exposure to the risks of Anglo-liberal capitalism, in 
the context of the increasing bifurcation between the domestic sphere and the international 
arena, with the former increasingly associated with debt, instability and fiscal burden, and the 
latter with wealth creation and wealth attribution (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017).  Exploring 
the relations between them also enables us to move the analysis beyond the conventional 
`heartlands’ of neoliberalism and extend it to include both core and peripheral positions 
within Anglo-liberal globalisation. The analysis will highlight the intersection of housing, work 
and welfare, as policy arenas which have not only been implicated in the pathways in and out 
of financial crisis in each country, but also in the ways in which debt and instability have been 
further embedded.  Consequently, we argue that we are witnessing the reconfiguration of 
prevailing societal norms within Anglo-liberal capitalism. This involves the codification and 
institutionalisation of `a concrete form of structural and behavioural power’ both 
transnationally and locally (Gill 1995:411) and the embedding of the governance of instability, 
coercive commodification and disciplinary neoliberalism in the domestic sphere.  
The article begins by establishing the theoretical and conceptual frame of disciplinary 
neoliberalism and links it to coercive commodification.  Drawing on the work of Gill, we locate 
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and integrate it both within the wider context of financialisation and of social policy debates 
on commodification. Within this framework we go on to explore the neoliberal pathways of 
the three countries, the dynamics of financialisation and the implications for instability and 
resistance in the context of embedded coercive commodification.  Whilst differences remain 
in the neoliberal pathways of each country, a `step-change’ and acceleration in the operation 
of disciplinary neoliberalism can be identified, and mediated in all three countries through 
coercive commodification and the housing-work-welfare nexus.  
 
Disciplinary neoliberalism, financialisation and Anglo-liberal globalisation 
In utilising the concept of disciplinary neoliberalism we take up Gill’s (1995) interpretation but 
re-position it in terms of the growth of financialisation in the two decades since his original 
assessment in the context of Anglo-liberal globalisation. This repositioning is in recognition 
not only of the ongoing resilience of neoliberalism but also of how global financial capital and 
financial market imperatives influence state-market relations and become intertwined with 
existing neoliberalising logics of competitiveness, marketisation and commodification. Gill 
examined the nature of disciplinary neoliberalism effected by the globalisation of neoliberal 
political economy in terms of two faces of power; one operating at a macro/transnational 
level and the other at a micro/local level. The first concerns the structural power of capital to 
impose discipline on public institutions and to make governments accountable to markets 
and the second is a form of behavioural power through which individuals are controlled and 
disciplined, which is micro and capillary in a Foucualdian sense.   This chimes with the work of 
Seabrooke and Wigan (2017:2) who suggest a parallel process has taken place with the 
emergence of a `notable disjuncture between territorially fixed fiscal and intrinsically fluid 
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financial systems’. They argue that the mobility of capital, and its ability to circumscribe the 
distribution of wealth through Global Wealth Chains, has created a schism between where 
value is created and the allocation of profits and wealth.  This is a process supported by the 
state through governance and transactional complexity and codification, with differential 
‘sets of rules’ applied to the domestic sphere and ‘to the virtual sphere, or, more prosaically, 
to internationally mobile people, entities, and assets’ (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017:6).   
The capacity to utilise wealth chains also varies between countries and reflects the 
hierarchical nature of the dimensions of power referred to by Gill, as well as the spatially 
differentiated and variegated forms of actually existing neoliberalism highlighted by Brenner 
et al (2010).   Differences in the effects of disciplinary neoliberalism at a transnational level 
‘involve a hierarchy of pressures and constraints on government autonomy that vary 
according to the size, economic strength, form of state and civil society, and prevailing 
national and regional institutional capabilities, as well as the degree of integration into global 
capital and money markets’ (Gill, 1995:415), with Ireland and the USA clearly situated at 
opposite ends of this spectrum.  
At the micro level, the ‘coercive face of the neoliberal state’, Gill (1995:415) discusses 
a range of surveillance and panoptic techniques enabled by the collection of information used 
to discipline individuals via sanctions (workfare), the denial or provision of credit, health care 
and insurance. The disciplinary hierarchy at international level is mirrored by the uneven 
weight of the logic of disciplinary neoliberalism within countries and the embedding of 
coercive commodification which reproduces ‘class, racial and gender hierarchies’ (Gill and 
Roberts, 2011:162) in how individuals are integrated into the labour and other markets, and 
how the disciplining effects of debt (mortgage and other personal debt), low-wage work and 
coercive forms of social policy are experienced.   
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The concept of coercive commodification allows us to connect Gill’s theoretical 
framework with the discipline of social policy and to open up the dynamics of disciplinary 
neoliberalism within the field of social policy practices.  Previously mooted by Laws (2009) in 
discussions on the credit crunch, we suggest that further elaboration of the term resonates 
with how welfare states, and particularly liberal welfare states, have evolved under the rise, 
crisis and further entrenchment of disciplinary neoliberalism. In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
work on de-commodification the emphasis was on the absence of compulsion.   He argued 
that de-commodified welfare removes the element of compulsion from the way that 
individuals engage with the market and sell their labour, involving what Sandel (2005:123) 
refers to as an `ideal of consent’. Subsequent work (see Pierson 2001), has focused on 
restructuring and re-commodification, as those aspects of welfare states that ‘shelter workers 
from market pressures’ (Pierson, 2001:422) have been dismantled.  However, Pierson (2001) 
also identifies how, particularly in liberal welfare states, dismantling social security operates 
in tandem with the introduction of market buffers such as tax credits/in work benefits and 
the subsidisation of access to private housing.  To be clear, these policy instruments do not 
detract from the shift back to commodification, but facilitate it by mediating market 
exposure.  As Pierson (2001: 435) noted, ‘the main political debate in the liberal welfare states 
has not focused on whether or not low-skilled workers should be in the labour market, but 
on the terms under which their participation should take place’. 
As re-structuring has progressed under disciplinary neoliberalism, and driven by the 
way the power of capital and particularly financial capital has altered market imperatives, we 
argue that the state’s role in commodifying welfare has become an increasingly coercive 
process.  This reflects the exigencies of globalised, financialised and increasingly unstable 
neoliberalism as democratic states are being turned into `debt collecting agencies on behalf 
6 
 
of a global oligarchy of investors’ (Streeck, 2011:12). Contemporary welfare policy and 
practice is thus more aptly denoted as coercive commodification, encompassing an orbit that 
forges a nexus between housing, work and welfare; closing down any vestiges of choice and 
stripping back subsequent policy buffers, and locking people into a circuit of low paid work, 
debt and housing precarity.    
Gill’s original formulation of disciplinary neoliberalism and new constitutionalism 
referred to mechanisms of surveillance and systems of control which `reduces the individual 
to a manipulable and relatively inert commodity’ (Gill 1995:415-416). In this article we also 
want to draw out, on the contrary, how disciplinary neoliberalism and coercive 
commodification not only shapes the conditions for resistance but also drives conflict, 
reaction and contestation.  We argue that as debt, instability and coercive commodification 
have further embedded and amplified disciplinary neoliberalism and repression post-crisis, 
this has also served to expose the financial hegemony of global institutions, assets and elites, 
and to open up new spaces of resistance at the global, national and local levels. The 
trajectories and variations in disciplinary neoliberalism and coercive commodification, as well 
as the dynamics of resistance will be discussed in the remainder of this article.  
  
Paths in and out of financial crisis  
In political economy terms, the US and the UK are considered exemplars of Anglo-liberal 
capitalism and exhibit the key features of low taxation, low state expenditure, limited state 
intervention, free trade and high levels of market income inequality.  Ireland shares some of 
these political-economic features but in a less overtly ideological polity. Structurally Ireland 
also occupies a peripheral position through the size of its economy and through what O’Hearn 
(2001) has outlined as its dependant position in the ‘Atlantic economy’ of the UK, USA and 
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Ireland. Thus, while the countries might display key features of Anglo-liberal capitalism and 
liberal welfare regime characteristics, amongst other differences they occupy unequal 
positions within that order, with the US and the UK at the core and drivers of that model and 
Ireland at the edge. However, at the core of this analysis the salience of what holds the Anglo-
liberal countries together, namely, their pursuit of ‘policies that seek to accommodate market 
imperatives’ (Castles, 2010:636) remains; our concern is to track the dynamics and 
implications of this across diverse sites of disciplinary neoliberalism.  Here we primarily use 
quantitative data to sketch the arc of financial crisis and crisis management across the three 
countries against longer term trends related to the rise of debt and inequality, and the 
privileging of capital over labour.  
Within the context of Anglo-liberal political economies prior to the crisis economic 
growth had increasingly been sought though financial rather than productive capital. This was 
accompanied by a distributional shift from labour to capital and a diminished working-class 
agency in terms of its expression via organised labour.  Drawing on Ó Riain’s (2012) method 
to calculate the growth of financialisation, Figure 1 demonstrates the share of profits within 
an economy going to financial activities in each country. We can see that this share, and by 
extension, the power of financial capital, rose dramatically in Ireland and the UK in the 2000s.  
The US had a steadier rise since the mid-1990s and the gap between financialisation in Europe 
and the US also narrowed over the 2000s reflecting the growth of financialisation in Europe, 
particularly in France and Germany, and the process of EU financial market integration 
(Macartney, 2010).  However, prior to the crisis, by the mid-2000s, the UK and Ireland were 
swept up in a deeper shift to financialised accumulation, compared to Germany and France.  
In the post-crisis period, data available for the UK (but not, at the time of writing, for Ireland) 
reveals no sign of a retreat from financialised accumulation.   
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[Figure 1] 
Therefore, while the financial sector in the US was at the root of the crisis, by this 
measure, the role of financialisation was greater in the UK and Irish contexts; a trend which 
is also reflected in the size of the financial sector relative to GDP and in the subsequent cost 
of bailing out the financial sector in each country, which we address later. It is also significant 
that the UK and Ireland are much more financially open than the USA and, as key financial 
services centres, facilitate the proliferation of global wealth chains. Both the UK and Ireland 
were and continue to be heavily implicated both as low-tax havens, that allow transnational 
corporations to sequester wealth (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2014; Gill, 2017), and as the on-
shore shadow-banking hosts of EU securitisation (Clark, 2016), making them particularly 
sensitive to and compliant with the interests of international financial capital.  
The financialisation of everyday life, expressed through the accumulation of 
household debt, is also a key feature of the Anglo-liberal experience, most particularly in 
Ireland which had the steepest increase in this measure in Europe over the 2000s. Strong 
increases were also apparent in the UK and the US prior to the crisis. As Figure 2 demonstrates 
household debt as a percentage of net disposable income increased substantially in all three 
counties, fuelled by easy credit, soaring house prices, stagnating incomes and a policy project 
of ‘assetising’ the working classes (Birch, 2015).  This accumulation of household debt 
increased the vulnerability of the poorest sections of the working class in each country, a 
segment of the population which intersected with gender and ethnic inequalities in terms of 
who was exposed to unsustainable debt (Dymski, 2012).  
 
[Figure 2] 
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While household debt increased, the share of national income going to workers through 
wages stagnated in the UK and declined in Ireland and the US, with Ireland being the more 
extreme example of decline (Figure 3).  This trend obscures the fact that the distribution of 
income also became more uneven, a pattern which is most extreme and more volatile in the 
US (Figure 4).  Volatility in the US context is however limited to ‘redistribution’ within the top 
20% of the income distribution, with most losses in the top 1% being spread as gains to the 
top 10% (Dufour and Orhangazi, 2014).  
 
[Figures 3 and 4] 
 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the US and the UK have historically had high incidences of 
low pay, measured as ‘the share of full-time workers earning less than two-thirds of gross 
median earnings of all full-time workers’ (OECD, 2017). This pattern has remained ‘stable’ at 
this high level since the 1980s, whilst (shorter term) trends for Ireland show that low pay rose 
substantially since the crisis (Figure 5).  In 2014 (the year with the most recent comprehensive 
data coverage) Ireland ranked second highest in the OECD, the US third and the UK eight.  
 
[Figure 5] 
 
These trends, which are indicative of the particular trajectories of long term decline in 
the power of labour vis-à-vis capital in each country, have been mirrored by a decline in trade 
union density and the erosion of traditional forms of resistance and collective action; union 
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membership has at least halved in all three countries since the early 1980s (Figure 6).  The US 
is clearly an outlier, while Ireland, which previously had relatively high levels in European 
terms has recently converged with the UK. The route to convergence comes from different 
configurations of state-union relations. In the UK unions have endured the legacy of hostility 
and weakened rights under Thatcherism, whilst Irish unions, fearing the punishment meted 
out to their UK counterparts (Mjøset, 1992), were incorporated into social partnership in 1987 
until it collapsed in 2009. The disparity between public sector and private sector union 
membership is also striking. In Ireland in 2014, 62.6% of the public sector were unionised 
compared to 16.4% of private sector workers (Walsh, 2015), while figures for the UK are 
52.7% and 13.4% respectively (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
2017). Austerity, in the shape of a 15% reduction in the UK public sector workforce between 
2010 and 2015 and increased use of outsourcing, has posed challenges for public sector 
organizational capacity. Provisions in the Trade Union Act 2016, including a higher threshold 
for lawful strike action, represent further attempts to demobilise trade unions in the UK 
(Bach, 2016). In the US, private sector union membership is practically non-existent at 
approximately 6.4%, whilst 34.4% of public sector workers are unionised (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, 2017a). Yet long-term hostility to public sector unionism has meant the sector has 
been losing power, evident most notably by the lack of a right to strike across several states 
(Fox-Piven, 2015).   The crisis presented another opportunity to weaken US public sector 
unions, with several states using it to weaken or abolish collective bargaining rights, under 
the mantle of privileged public sector workers as the root of states’ fiscal crises (Crotty, 2012).  
 
[Figure 6] 
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Bifurcated Anglo-liberal capitalism and `back to the future’.   
Each country’s financialised growth model temporarily unravelled into a full blown financial 
crisis of the late 2000s.  From the perspective of disciplinary neoliberalism, what is significant 
is the scale of subsequent government intervention and the articulation of the bifurcation 
between the domestic sphere and the international arena in terms of who should bear the 
debt and fiscal responsibility, and in how neoliberalism’s financial crisis-making conditions 
have been re-booted.    
In their comparative analysis of systemic banking crises Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
show that of the countries experiencing such crises in the late 2000s, the US, Ireland, the UK 
and Nigeria were the only four countries to undertake the full range of state interventions: 
extensive liquidity support, significant guarantees on liabilities, restructuring costs, asset 
purchase and nationalisations. While the cost of those interventions added to the balance 
sheets in all countries, the overall cost varied depending on the size of the financial sector 
and the magnitude of each type of intervention used.  Fiscal outlays were estimated to cost 
40% of GDP in Ireland, 8.8% of GDP in the UK and 4.5% of GDP in the US (Laeven and Valencia 
2012:28).  In the EU context, reflecting the extent of their financialised economies, the UK 
and Ireland ranked first and second on the league table for costliest bank recapitalisations 
involving RBS, a UK bank and Anglo Irish Bank, an Irish bank, which respectively required 
€50bn and €32bn of public money (European Commission, nd).    
In Ireland’s case, its adoption of a blanket bank guarantee proved to be its downfall 
and cue for heavy market discipline, with long-term interest rates for Irish government bonds 
escalating to increasingly punitive levels, peaking at 9.6% in 2011.  Despite adopting austerity 
measures as early as mid-2008, its banking sector turned out too big to rescue by the state 
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alone (Dukelow, 2015a).  Market panic was also used as a disciplinary tool of the ECB, an 
institution which has become an agent of disciplinary neoliberalism in the way that is armed 
with ‘increasing autonomous power to decide whether to create money and under which 
conditions to distribute it’ (della Porta, 2017: 21). As such, there are traces of direct ECB 
coercion both at the time the bank guarantee was put in place and again at the point of 
entering a loan agreement with the Troika (Ó Riain, 2016). While Ireland was one of the 
debtor states disciplined by the ECB, the wider use of quantitative easing by the ECB, 
specifically credit easing by providing credit to the banking system, has on the other hand, 
been implemented in the spirit of restoring the financial sector to health and in the process 
benefiting private finance (Chang, 2013).  
Meanwhile, the adoption of new fiscal governance rules under the fiscal compact 
institutionalises austerity within the EU in unison with the pressure exerted by financial capital 
(Gill, 2017). Public expenditure in the Eurozone and the rules with which Ireland must comply 
are subject to a new round of disciplinary neoliberalism and new constitutionalism via what 
Gill (2017) calls the strengthening of ‘Financial Europe’ over ‘Social Europe’.  The revised 
institutional architecture of EU monetary and fiscal governance ‘lock in’ disciplinary 
neoliberalism (Gill, 2017:639; and see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, this issue). In the Irish 
case, this is not as disruptive a shift as that experienced by the Southern European states, 
where the dynamics of a ‘technocratic neoliberal regime shift’ (Jessop, 2015:94) have been in 
play (see also Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, this issue).  As an already globalised and 
financialised economy, Ireland had turned to austerity prior to Troika conditionality and the 
reforms required by the Troika focused relatively more on financial restructuring than on 
welfare and labour market policy (Dukelow, 2015b). Moreover, the austerity driven welfare 
reforms that took place under Troika surveillance were not solely a matter of the imposition 
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of external discipline, to some extent the mantle of the Troika was a means of enabling and 
hastening domestically preferred reforms (Dukelow, 2015b; Hick, 2018).  
Compared to Ireland, which had no control over monetary policy, nor the power to 
‘print’ money to pay its debts, and which forced it to borrow according to the terms of private 
financial markets, the US and the UK had more latitude over monetary and fiscal policy.  In 
the global hierarchy of disciplinary neoliberalism, both countries also had relatively greater 
power to ‘prevent financial markets from dictating the terms of finance’ (Kelton, 2015:36). 
However, in both cases use of monetary policy, specifically quantitative easing, was used to 
restore the financialised dynamics of the US and the UK economies, emboldening their 
banking systems in the process (Watkins, 2010). In the case of the US, its extensive use of 
quantitative easing until 2013 was used not only to increase the money supply, but also, as 
Bryan and Rafferty (2017) note, to maintain households as an ‘asset class’.  This strategy would 
safeguard securitised assets as revenue streams by ensuring that households are able to 
continue to meet their debt obligations. Thus, the US Fed used quantitative easing to buy up 
mortgage backed securities in a strategy used in tandem with expanding credit again to 
households as a way of re-financialising the economy post-crisis. However, the effect of this 
policy was to restore any losses that the wealthiest lost during the financial crisis and to re-
inflate asset bubbles and associated risk taking. Racial disparities have also been a constant 
thread over the boom, bust and re-booting cycle of the US housing market, with Black and 
Hispanic people much more likely to have experienced restrictions in access to credit and high 
cost lending both pre- and post-crisis, whilst also being at much higher risk of foreclosure 
during the height of the financial crisis (Mahmud, 2012; Faber, 2017). A comparatively weaker 
deficit financed fiscal stimulus programme under the Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 
had minor effects, with the recovery in employment and wages remaining subdued (Dufour 
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and Orhangazi, 2014). However, fiscal policy came under pressure by a mix of fiscal 
austerians, including conservative politicians and the growing power of the Tea Party, leading 
to a more decisive turn to austerity by 2013; despite the US having similar latitude in this 
domain without having to be overly fearful of financial market discipline.  
The UK had similar latitude over monetary and fiscal policy, yet, like the US, 
quantitative easing has been used primarily to re-inflate the value of stock market assets and 
house prices. This has had similar effects to the pursuit of this policy in the US: ‘widening 
inequality, stagnating real wages and a return to household indebtedness and potential 
financial fragility’ (Kelton, 2015:39).  While the UK was not part of the Eurozone and the 
Stability and Growth Pact, new constitutionalist rules were instituted by Labour under its 
fiscal policy adopted in 1997.  Thus, two disciplinary parameters were applied to public 
borrowing; first, the ‘golden rule’ that borrowing would be for capital purposes only, and 
second, a ‘stable investment rule’ stipulating that total government debt would remain below 
40% of GDP. While these rules were suspended in the early phase of the financial crisis, by 
2010 the Fiscal Responsibility Act laid down rules for progressively reducing borrowing 
requirements as the crisis evolved.  These rules were tightened under the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government in tandem with using similar disciplinary 
tactics as the ECB and resorting to the spectre of financial market panic and credit rating doom 
in the event of failure to reduce deficits (Sawyer, 2012). Following the logic of disciplinary 
neoliberalism, financial markets and financial capital were favoured under quantitative easing 
while fiscal policy was used as a tool to further erode the already weakened protective effects 
of the UK welfare state and to deepen the effects of debt and discipline on welfare subjects. 
 
Embedding coercive commodification and disciplinary neoliberalism 
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Whilst monetary and fiscal policy were used to rescue and re-inflate financialised capital, at 
the micro level, the logics of disciplinary neoliberalism have embedded the policy and practice 
of coercive commodification. Yet variegated patterns exist here too. As ‘heartlands’ of 
neoliberalism, combined with the fact that the US and the UK also share long histories of 
‘illiberal’ social policy (King, 1999), both country’s recent evolution of coercive 
commodification embed already existing regimes.  The Irish case represents a more novice 
turn, following the severity of its recent phase of disciplinary neoliberalism, which has 
reduced its capacity to implement compensatory social policies that tended to exist alongside 
a more explicitly neoliberalised economic regime. Nonetheless, in each case, the intersecting 
evolution of housing, work and welfare policies erode both choices and buffers, and ‘lock in’ 
coercive commodification.  As social safety nets evolve in more punitive ways, an emerging 
opposite effect is the ‘lock out’ of marginalised individuals from access to decent work, 
welfare or housing that protects them from destitution.   
Accordingly, in the US, the shift to austerity by 2013 builds on a much longer trajectory 
of coercive commodification.  The decisive turn occurred two decades earlier with the 
introduction of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (1996) under a 
confluence of neoliberal and conservative influences (Waddan, 2015).  The punitive workfare 
measures and restricted eligibility associated with Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), 
instituted under the Act, has meant that the long-term trend has been declining numbers in 
receipt of TANF (Tach and Edin, 2017).  Nevertheless, under recent austerity funding for TANF 
tightened and tougher sanctions were implemented across several states (Tach and Edin, 
2017).  The severity of this level of coercive commodification has meant that a growing 
number of people are effectively ‘locked out’; people not in employment and not eligible for 
aid has given rise to the ‘discovery’ of extreme poverty in the US, measured by metrics used 
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to calculate poverty in the developing world, that is living on $2 or less per day (Edin and 
Schafer 2015 in Tach and Edin, 2017). In contrast, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
designed to support low-paid work has had a ‘meteoric rise’ (Hacker, 2016:778) since its 
introduction in the 1970s.  However, the extent to which it buffers workers, rather than simply 
coercing them into low paid work in the absence of out-of-work welfare for those without 
social security, and thus sustaining the sizeable low-wage sector in the US economy, is 
questionable.  The historically high level of low paid work in US has not declined over time 
(see Figure 5 and earlier discussion) and the intersecting problem of in-work poverty is one 
which disproportionately affects women, and Black and Hispanic people (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, 2017b).  Tax expenditures supporting the working poor also pale in comparison to 
the cost of tax expenditures accruing to the wealthiest workers (Hacker, 2016). The evolution 
of supports for housing tracks a similar divide.  Not all households were borne up by the policy 
of using quantitative easing to maintain their assetised status, those deemed less credit-
worthy and who are without access to credit and without housing equity post-crisis are the 
direct targets of disciplinary neoliberalism via cuts to housing assistance, another 
discretionary item of expenditure states could cut as austerity took hold (Goering and 
Whitehead, 2017). This builds upon a long-term shift towards the commodification of housing 
supports, from public provision, which has effectively disappeared in the US, to support in the 
private rental market (Hanlon, 2017). However, this support is also divided by those who work 
and don’t work, with more support for affordable housing channelled to low-paid workers via 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) than it is to the unemployed/lowest income 
families. Yet, the effectiveness of the LIHTC as a market buffer is also questionable given that 
almost half of all renter households count as rent burdened (Joint Center for Housing Studies 
of Harvard University, 2017).   
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Similarly, in the UK, whilst the erosion of the benefit system can be traced to the mid-
1980s, the more decisive turn to coercive commodification occurred under New Labour from 
1997. This involved the introduction of new conditions and tools to survey claimants’ efforts 
to progress to work.  However, these measures were also combined with market buffers; 
following the US example of EITC, Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in 1999 (Clegg, 
2015).  Since the 2010s the coercive commodification of the system has intensified, targeting 
not only those outside the labour market, but also those in insecure, low-paid employment. 
Fletcher and Wright (2017) identify increased use of strategies of surveillance, sanction, and 
deterrence. In particular, sanction rates have escalated, imposed on one quarter of Jobseeker 
Allowance recipients between 2010 and 2015.  And, as the Universal Credit system is being 
rolled out, replacing a range of separate tax credits, emerging data on sanction rates are 
demonstrating even higher rates (Webster, 2017 in Fletcher and Wright, 2017).  
Changes in the social security system intersect with the coercive commodification of 
the social housing system, loading risk and insecurity on those who depend on public housing 
support. The security of social housing tenure has been diminished, fuelled not only by 
budgetary constraints but also the view that social housing for life encourages dependency 
and ‘worklessness’ (Murie and Williams, 2015). The Localism Act 2011 enables local 
authorities to prioritise the allocation of social housing tenancies to working people, and to 
bring social housing tenancies closer to conditions in the private rented sector by setting rents 
at up to 80% of market levels and stipulating fixed terms rather than life-time tenancy. And, 
tracking the longer-term reliance on the private rental sector in the US, those in housing need 
are increasingly channelled into the private rental sector, whilst a series of stricter limits have 
been placed on eligibility rules and on the value of Housing Benefit.  Assistance for 
unemployed people with a high housing debt burden has also tightened with the conversion 
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of a mortgage interest payment grant with a loan system (Tunstall, 2016). On the other hand, 
the Help to Buy scheme, introduced in 2013, succeeded in assisting the more financially 
privileged to purchase housing, and chimes with the monetary policy project of re-
financialising the economy post-crisis.   
In contrast to the longer, albeit deepening, regimes of coercive commodification in 
the US and the UK, Ireland’s more novice experience with coercive commodification began 
with a framing of the social protection system that was ‘overly generous and poorly policed’ 
(NESC, 2011: 2) early in Ireland’s crisis. The key components of Ireland’s turn towards coercive 
commodification include the institutionalisation of a stricter benefit regime, eroding the 
duration of insurance payments and tightening eligibility (which particularly impacted young 
people and lone parents); and the introduction of more coercive labour market programmes 
coupled with the increasing use of disciplinary surveillance techniques and sanctions.  This is 
reflected in the legalisation and codification of coercive commodification through the Social 
Welfare Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2010 which introduced penalty rates, and its further 
embedding in the 2013 Social Welfare Act which goes as far as disqualification from a 
payment for nine weeks for individuals who continually fail to comply.   
Since their introduction, the limited nature of data publicly available shows that the 
total number of penalty rates applied to those in receipt of Jobseeker payments has increased 
from 359 in 2011 to 10, 867 in 2016; the application of sanctions thus continues to increase 
even after levels of unemployment began to subside from 2012, although it does not reach 
anything like the level of sanctions applied in the UK (Dukelow and Heins, 2017).  Plans are 
afoot to bring more people into the system with the intent of helping to ‘ensure a supply of 
labour at competitive rates and to minimise welfare dependency’ (Government of Ireland, 
2016:14).  Whilst some new in work benefits are being introduced, their ability to buffer 
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market pressures in the context of Ireland’s flexible labour market and high incidence of low 
pay remains to be seen.  
To compound this, low income households feature prominently in the escalating 
number of homeless families since the mid-2010s. Tracking the UK and the US, increasingly 
those in housing need are required to meet that need through the private market, with 
Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) assistance.  Housing risk is thus transferred to individuals, 
who are vulnerable to eviction in the context of limits to HAP, ineffective attempts to regulate 
rising rents, and housing shortage; demonstrating a ‘lock out’ effect of coercive 
commodification. For homeowners in mortgage distress, which has also escalated post-crisis, 
very limited forms of debt relief mean that this group is also ‘locked in’ to coercive 
commodification, moderated only by a policy of bank forebearance, put in place in part to 
protect the capital base of the banks (Waldron and Redmond, 2014).   
 
Instability, resistance and disciplinary neoliberalism 
Having drawn out the dynamics, processes and practices of disciplinary relations between 
state, market and society in Ireland, the UK and the USA, and the deepening emphasis on 
coercive commodification post-crisis in previous sections of this article, we now turn to 
consider the implications for resistance and contestation.  Far from disciplinary neoliberalism 
and new constitutionalism reducing individuals to manipulable and inert subjects, it is the 
very contradictions and negative consequences on conditions of everyday life that have 
opened up new spaces for resistance and revolt. 
In the context of financialised neoliberalism and coercive commodification strategies 
and mechanisms for resistance have become more constrained.  As traditional avenues for 
protest and collective action have been eroded, the power of labour vis-à-vis capital 
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diminished, and the `protective’ capacity of the welfare state diminished, coercion, debt and 
instability have become more deeply embedded in peoples’ everyday life.  Hartmann and 
Honneth (2006:51) suggest a process of ‘social desolidarisation’ has taken place.  They see 
this as an effect of the transformation of social rights into ‘economised social services’ and 
the remoralisation and paternalisation of entitlements and welfare provision.   Solidarity can 
also be seen to be increasingly diffuse and divisive as the bifurcated and multi-scalar nature 
of financialised capital and global wealth chains blurs the dynamics of oppression and 
inequality, whilst diverse interpretations of the causes of the global financial crisis has given 
rise to the articulation of demands emanating from a wide range of voices from across the 
political spectrum.  
However, the exposure of the drivers of the global economic crisis, the institutional 
responses, combined with the diverging fortunes of capital and labour post-crisis has brought 
into sharper focus the deepening contradictions of financialised capitalism, and its embedding 
in everyday life through instruments of coercive commodification. Whilst disciplinary 
neoliberalism attempts to shrink the space and opportunity for resistance, it is also a driver 
of conflict between classes, cultures and lifestyles, and political groupings, generating macro 
and micro level revolt against global elites and institutions, as well as localised responses to 
and protest against single issue campaigns. In all three countries both traditional and new 
social movements have given voice to alternate narratives of `austerity capitalism’; for 
example the Occupy Movement, the Scottish Nationalist Party, and Jeremy Corbyn, elected 
as the UK Labour Party leader and making substantial inroads into the Conservative majority 
in the 2017 election, as well as the growth of a larger but still typically fragmented Left in 
Ireland.  The intensification of disciplinary neoliberalism in relation to both labour and the 
welfare state has been accompanied by Anti-Austerity marches in all three countries, as well 
21 
 
as public sector protests in both UK and the USA, and a large and sustained anti-water charge 
movement in Ireland which is now embracing a wider range of social issues.    There has also 
been an increasing dissatisfaction with the `European project’, EU institutions, technocrats 
and political elite, the rise of anti-EU sentiment, and a sense of policy failure and diminishing 
vertical and horizontal solidarity between EU institutions, members states and citizens, 
particularly in the UK, but rather more muted in Ireland.  This has given rise to increasing 
support for political parties that are explicitly opposed to membership of the EU, as well as 
the increased risk of social unrest amongst the countries of the EU, which the ILO (2013:14) 
attributes to the `policy responses to the ongoing sovereign debt crisis and their impacts on 
people’s lives and perceptions of well-being’.  
The UK’s narrow vote to leave the EU by 2019, following the UK EU referendum in 
June 2016, highlighted deep anti-establishment dissatisfaction, as did the election of Donald 
Trump in the USA in the same year.  Whilst there is no simple explanation for the Brexit vote 
in the UK or the narrow victory of Donald Trump in the USA, both can be associated with 
increasing distrust and disjuncture between international institutions, domestic political 
elites, and the erosion of public services, and particularly to the increasingly obvious 
bifurcated and exploitative nature of Anglo-liberal globalisation. In the USA, this 
dissatisfaction was fuelled by concerns regarding the Clinton Legacy, and the Alt-Right wing 
agenda which remains prominent. The irony is that since the election of Donald Trump shares 
in the biggest US banks have risen, as Trump is viewed as committed to reviewing financial 
regulation and sweeping away restrictions.  Moreover, several Goldman Sachs alumni have 
secured senior jobs in the Trump Administration (Financial Times, 2017), which suggests far 
from a radical reappraisal of the disciplinary relations between state, market and society it is 
the further strengthening and embedding of the structural and behavioural power of capital 
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and the state.  Whilst the bar has been raised for movements of resistance and working-class 
insurgency, the increase in acts of resistance, particularly in higher income countries and the 
increasingly `unreasonable demands, discipline or insecurity’ (Hartmann and Honneth 
2006:49) being experienced by households in all three countries suggests a strengthening of 
insurgency and resistance to disciplinary neoliberalism. 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst differences remain between the three Anglo-liberal political economies of the UK, the 
USA and Ireland this article has sought to draw out a comparative political economy in the 
context of financialised capitalism and disciplinary neoliberalism.  Drawing on and further 
developing the work of Gill (1995) the article highlights the increasing disjuncture between 
the international arena of capital mobility, wealth creation and wealth attribution, and the 
domestic sphere, increasingly associated with debt, instability and fiscal responsibility.  These 
changes represent a reconfiguration of and step-change in the prevailing societal norms in 
each of the countries as processes contributing to a deepening of disciplinary neoliberalism 
and coercive commodification through which people are ‘locked-in’ to a circuit of insecurity 
and debt.  
The dynamics of struggle and conflict - in the context of the shrinking of `spaces of 
resistance’, falling real wages, declining union membership, and coercive commodification – 
emerge in the crosshairs of capitals contradictions which are becoming ever more apparent, 
and are expressed and articulated through macro and micro forms of protest, alternative 
narratives and contested politics.  The current mode of capitalist development across all three 
counties in this study is relying on the deregulation of `the social’, and the embedding of 
coercion, instability and debt in everyday life meditated by the state, for its successful 
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implementation.  However, it is these very dynamics through which forms of protest are 
emerging to destabilise, disrupt and disturb contemporary capitalism and with the potential 
to shape its future trajectory. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of all corporate profits going to financial intermediation 1987–2015 
 
Source: OECD STAN database (data for Ireland from older STAN dataset (ISIC Rev 4, SNA93)) 
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Source: OECD.Stat   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Wage share 1980-2017 
 
Source: AMECO Database   
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Figure 4: Top 1% income share 1980-2015 
 
Source:  World Wealth and Income database 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Incidence of low pay 1980–2016 
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Source: OECD.Stat  
 
Figure 6: Trade Union Density 1980-2014 
 
Source: OECD.Stat   
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